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STATES ARE PEOPLE TOO
Suzanna Sherry*
There is a joke making the rounds that purports to explain the
Supreme Court's 1998-1999 Term, especially the three federalism
cases decided on the last day: The Y2K bug hit the Court six months
early, and the Court thought the year was 1900. Like most good jokes,
this one has a kernel of truth. The Court's fin de sicle decisions-
both sets of them-seem oddly focused on expanding the constitu-
tional definition of personhood. At the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, corporations became people. At the end of the twentieth, it was
states.
Americans have not always viewed corporations kindly. In the
first half of the nineteenth century, they were feared and therefore
legally limited. As Lawrence Friedman explains,
This typical, American fear was the source out of which the system
of checks and balances had grown. It was fear of unbridled power,
as possessed by large landholders and dynastic wealth, as well as by
government. An influential segment of the public was willing to try
many techniques to prevent concentration of authority and to offset
the corrosive effect of money and power.1
Statutes, constitutions, and common law doctrines limited corpo-
rate power, and courts strictly enforced the limitations.2 Eventually,
of course, the economic benefits of a corporate structure-and the
inevitable tendency of any powerful institution to expand-led to a
loosening of legal restraints.
But, as Friedman notes, the gradual rise in public acceptance of
the corporate form was "neither painless nor noiseless."3 Well into
the 1870s, courts were still willing to police the excesses of corporate
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota.
1 LAWRENcE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERIcAN LAW 171 (1973).
2 See generally id. at 166-78, 446-48; Gregory A. Mark, Note, The Personification of
the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1441, 1448-55 (1987).
3 FRmDMAN, supra note 1, at 171.
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greed, whether by imposing liability for fraud or by enforcing legisla-
tive regulations despite constitutional challenges.
4
After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, corporations be-
gan to challenge various state regulations as a violation of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. One of the first courts to con-
sider explicitly whether the Fourteenth Amendment's protections ex-
tended to corporations held that they did not. A careful reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment led Circuit Judge (later Supreme Court
Justice) William Woods to that conclusion:
Are corporations persons within the meaning of the same amend-
ment? The word "person" occurs three times in the first section, in
the following connections: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States'--"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, lib-
erty or property," etc.-nor" shall any state "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The com-
plainants claim that this last clause applies to corporations-artifi-
cial persons. Only natural persons can be born or naturalized; only
natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty; so that it is clear
that artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of the first
two clauses just quoted. If we adopt the construction claimed by
complainants, we must hold that the word "person," where it occurs
the third time in this section, has a wider and more comprehensive
meaning than in the other clauses of the section where it occurs.
This would be a construction for which we find no warrant in the
rules of interpretation. The plain and evident meaning of the sec-
tion is, that the persons to whom the equal protection of the law is
secured are persons born or naturalized or endowed with life and
liberty, and consequently natural and not artificial persons. This
construction of the section is strengthened by the history of the sub-
mission by Congress, and the adoption by the states of the 14th
amendment, so fresh in all minds as to need no rehearsal. We are
of opinion, therefore, that the ordinance of the city of New Orleans
is not in violation of the provisions of the 14th amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.5
Both the Slaughterhouse Cases6 in 1873 and Munn v. Illinois7 (and
the other Granger cases) in 1877 made clear that the Fourteenth
4 On fraud suits, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 448-52.
5 Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (No. 7052) (C.C.D. La. 1870).
6 83 U.S. 36 (1873). For a good history of the case, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTER'isE AND AMERIcAN LAW 1836-1937, at 116-24 (1991).
7 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see also CHARLEs FAIRMAN, 7 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 327-71
(1987).
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Amendment did not significantly limit states' ability to regulate busi-
ness practices, including those of corporations.
But by 1882 the judiciary's view of the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment was already changing. Another circuit judge disagreed
with Judge Woods, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did apply
to corporations as well as to natural persons.8 Two years later, Francis
Wharton published his influential Commentaries on Law, in which he
characterized the Fourteenth Amendment as "destroy[ing] the power
which had been assumed by state legislatures of interfering with pri-
vate business."9
Then in 1886, the Supreme Court stepped into the breach. With-
out explanation and without hearing argument, the Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause extended to corporations. In Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,' 0 the Southern Pacific chal-
lenged a state tax levy on various grounds, including that it violated
the Equal Protection Clause. According to the United States Reports,
Before argument, Mr. ChiefJustice Waite said: The court does not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a state
to deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, applies to
these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does."'
Justice Harlan eventually wrote the unanimous opinion invalidat-
ing the levy as a violation of California law; the Court ultimately did
not reach the federal constitutional question. Three years later, in
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith,12 the Court unani-
mously held that the Due Process Clause also applies to corporations,
explaining only that "[i]t was so held" in Santa Clara County.13 At the
8 See County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal.
1882).
9 FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAv, EMBRACING CHAPTERS ON THE NA-
TuRE, THE SoURCE, AND THE HIsTORY OF LAW, ON INTERNATIONAL LAw, PuBLIc AND
PRIVATE, AND ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAw (1884), quoted in HoVENKAM',
supra note 6, at 95.
10 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
11 Id. at 396.
12 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
13 Id. at 28. An intervening case, Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888), held that corporations are not citizens within the
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Court in Pembina also upheld
the challenged state statute-which imposed special conditions on out-of-state corpo-
rations doing business in the state-against an equal protection challenge: "The state
is not prohibited from discriminating in the privileges it may grant to foreign corpora-
tions as a condition of their doing business or hiring offices within its limits, provided
always such discrimination does not interfere with any transaction by such corpora-
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same time, the Court began developing the doctrine of substantive
due process, which gave anti-regulatory content to the newly ex-
panded Fourteenth Amendment protections. 14 The 1880s and 1890s
were, in the words of one historian, "the apogee" of the "classical
model" of political economy.15
It is perhaps too late in the day to argue that Santa Clara County
and Beckwith ought to be overruled, but it is important to note the
sleight of hand by which corporations' status as persons was estab-
lished. Santa Clara County gives no reasons or argument, and the de-
termination that the Equal Protection Clause extends to corporations
is surely dicta since the Court did not need to decide whether the tax
in question violated the clause. Moreover, the Due Process Clause was
never at issue in Santa Clara County, so it was disingenuous for the
Beckwith Court to characterize the case as having held that the Due
Process Clause also extends to corporations. And neither holding is
particularly attentive to the language of the Amendment: as Judge
Wood noted, extending protection to corporations requires that
courts interpret the word "persons" differently for different clauses of
the same amendment. (Indeed, corporations are still not entitled to
claim the protections of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 16) Nev-
ertheless, despite the paucity of reasoning, the irrelevance of the con-
stitutional question to the holding in Santa Clara County, and
Beckwith's inaccurate citation of Santa Clara County for a proposition
never considered in that case, Santa Clara County and Beckwith are rou-
tinely cited as establishing that corporations are entitled to Four-
teenth Amendment rights.
17
tions of interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 189. The Court also repeated, with-
out citation, its earlier determination that "[u]nder the designation of person there is
no doubt that a private corporation is included," noting that "corporations are merely
associations of individuals united for a special purpose." Id.
14 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down state insurance
regulation as violation of Due Process Clause); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
(upholding state liquor law but indicating that state police power was substantively
limited by 14th Amendment). The state courts had been breathing substantive life
into the Due Process Clause for some time. See, e.g., Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454
(Ill. 1895); In reJacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa.
1886).
15 HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 13.
16 See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
656 (1981).
17 See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949) (Jackson,J,
concurring); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897);
Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896). At
least one commentator suggests that modem jurisprudence misinterprets Santa Clara
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The result, according to a turn-of-the-century commentator, was
to place corporations in "an almost impregnable constitutional posi-
tion."18 "Impregnable," according to Webster's, means "unassailable,"
which is itself defined as "not liable to doubt, attack, or question."
And after the trilogy of sovereign immunity cases from last term, states
are certainly unassailable: they cannot be attacked or questioned by
individuals in any court, even when they violate federal law.19
I will leave it to others in this Symposium to explain how thor-
oughly the Court's broad reading of the Eleventh Amendment com-
bines with its narrow reading of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect the states from repercussions for violating fed-
eral law. What I find particularly fascinating about last term's cases is
how the Court seems to portray states not just as impregnable, but as
human.
The most striking example is the Court's use of analogies be-
tween state sovereign immunity and individual rights. In College Sav-
ings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postseconday Education Expense Board20
(College Savings Bank), the Court considered the question of whether
the state's commercial activities should be construed as a waiver of its
sovereign immunity. In concluding that there was no waiver, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion analogizes the waiver of sovereign immunity
to "other constitutionally protected privileges,"21 including the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the right to trial by jury protected by the
Sixth Amendment in criminal cases and the Seventh Amendment in
civil cases, and procedural due process. 22
County when it attributes to the case an intent to equate corporations with persons.
See Mark, supra note 2, at 1463-64.
18 Arthur T. Hadley, The ConstitutionalPosition of Property in America, 64 INDEP. 834,
836 (1908).
19 Accuracy compels me to note that under Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
of course, states can be sued by individuals seeking prospective relief. But while such
a suit might put an end to the ongoing federal violation, it does not provide a remedy
for those who have been damaged. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2294 n.43
(1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 691-92
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[n]o other remedy [besides monetary
penalties] can effectively deter states from the strong temptation" to save money by
violating federal law).
20 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
21 Id. at 2229.
22 See id. Justice Scalia explicitly mentions the right to a jury trial in criminal
cases and then cites the following cases in support of his argument that constructive
waivers are an anomaly: Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel), Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389 (1937) (right to jury trial in civil
cases), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (due
process).
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Justice Scalia also quotes an 1883 case holding that state sover-
eign immunity is "a personal privilege, which it may waive at plea-
sure."23 Although the case, Clark v. Barnard, is frequently cited for the
proposition that states may waive their sovereign immunity and con-
sent to suit, the Supreme Court has not quoted the "personal privi-
lege" language since 1933-and the term "personal privilege" appears
only twice in the Court's sovereign immunity cases between Clark atid
1933.24
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden v. Maine25 similarly
invokes individual constitutional rights. In response to an argument
in Justice Souter's dissent, Justice Kennedy argues that although state
sovereign immunity is derived in part from common law, it is nonethe-
less a constitutional principle and as such unalterable by Congress.
And like Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy turns to individual rights as an
example:
The text and the structure of the Constitution protect various rights
and principles. Many of these, such as the right to trial by jury and
the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, derive from
the common law. The common-law lineage of these rights does not
mean they are defeasible by statute or remain mere common-law
rights, however. They are, rather, constitutional rights, and form
the fundamental law of the land.
2 6
And not only do states seem to have "rights": even the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions plays a role in protecting states. Justice
Scalia suggests that one of the problems with the doctrine of construc-
tive waiver is that it makes giving up a constitutional right a condition
for state participation in specified activities: "In the present case,...
what Congress threatens if the State refuses to agree to its condition
is ... a sanction: exclusion of the State from otherwise permissible
activity."27
These new persons also apparently have human emotions.
Throughout Alden, Justice Kennedy worries about the potential af-
front to the "dignity" of states were individuals permitted to sue them.
Kennedy writes that the Constitution "reserves to [the states] ... the
23 Id. at 2226 (quoting Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)) (emphasis
added).
24 See Missouri v. Fiske, 200 U.S. 18, 24 (1933); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441
(1900); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 392 (1894).
25 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
26 Id. at 2256.
27 College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.
Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999).
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dignity and essential attributes" of primary sovereigns,28 and that they
"retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty."2 9
He notes that immunity is "central to sovereign dignity"30 and that
immunity from suit is necessary "to preserve the dignity of the
States."3' Congress, too, must consider the states' feelings: it must "re-
spect" states and "accord States the esteem due to them."3 2 (The self-
esteem movement seems to have no bounds!) Thus, allowing Con-
gress to subject the states to private suits is "neither becoming nor
convenient,"3 3 for it "denigrates" the sovereignty of the states.3 Not
since extending the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to cor-
porations has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity.
Most intriguing of all, states are entitled to what can only be
called autonomy and freedom from enforced conformity. In Alden,
Justice Kennedy warns against giving Congress the power to "comman-
deer" a state's political machinery "against its will" 35-bringing to
mind nothing so much as an independent toddler dragged along by a
determined parent. In College Savings Bank, Justice Scalia decries Jus-
tice Breyer's comparison of the majority's ruling to the discredited
Lochner case.3 6 Scalia notes that the distinctive feature of Lochner and
its progeny was "that it sought to impose a particular economic philos-
ophy on the Constitution."37 And he accuses Breyer of wanting to
resurrect Lochner by allowing waivers if a state engages in commer-
cial-as opposed to sovereign-activities: "Justice Breyer's dissent...
believes that States should not enjoy the normal constitutional protec-
tions of sovereign immunity when they step out of their proper eco-
nomic role to engage in (we are sure Mr. Herbert Spencer would be
shocked) 'ordinary commercial ventures.'"38
Justice Scalia's language here echoes countless cases in which the
Supreme Court struck down discriminatory laws that confined women
to traditional roles. Again and again the Court has cautioned that
28 College Say. Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2247.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2264.
32 Id. at 2268; see also id. at 2263 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) (stating that the principle of sover-
eign immunity "accords the States the respect owed to them").
33 Id. at 2263 (quoting In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
34 Id. at 2264.
35 Id.
36 College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2238 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
37 Id. at 2233.
38 Id.
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states could not enact legislation based on "fixed notions concerning
the roles and abilities of males and females."39 As early as 1979 the
Court held that discriminatory "statutes cannot be validated on the
basis of the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibili-
ties under which the wife plays a dependent role."40 Some of the
scholarly literature on gay rights exhibits a similar focus on role con-
formity. One scholar suggests that statutes that "confine, normalize,
and functionalize identities" violate the right of privacy by "direct[ing]
a life's development along a particular avenue."41 In accusingJustice
Breyer of wanting to limit states to their traditional roles, then, Justice
Scalia seems to view states as having the attributes of autonomous
personhood.
This personification of states echoes the personification of corpo-
rations. One author describes the personification of the corporation
as "vital" because it "defines, encourages and legitimates the corpora-
tion as an autonomous, creative, self-directed economic being," and "cap-
tures rights, ultimately even constitutional rights, for corporations."42 The
language of Alden and College Savings Bank projects the same attributes
onto states.
And like the Court's foray into personhood at the end of the
nineteenth century, this one, too, is divorced from the constitutional
language. The Eleventh Amendment, as even the majority concedes,
says nothing about suits by citizens of other states, and nothing about
suits in state court.43 Moreover, by using the phrase "shall not be con-
strued to extend," rather than the simpler "shall not extend," the
39 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420, 469 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 591, and Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725). The fact that Justice Scalia dissented in United
States v. Virginia suggests that it is more permissible to confine women to certain roles
than to confine states.
40 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 269 (1979).
41 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 784, 788 (1989).
42 Mark, supra note 2, at 1443 (emphasis added).
43 On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example,
MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather Than
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1
(1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv.
L. REv. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989),James E. Pfander,
History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CoR-
1128 [VOL- 75:3
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Amendment suggests that it is meant to limit only judicial, not con-
gressional, action.44 The Court's extended historical argument in Al-
den-which is largely irrelevant to the Alden question and is soundly
trounced on the Seminole Tribe question by Justice Souter's historical
dissents in both cases-ultimately reduces to little more than the ipse
dixit of Santa Clara County: the majority simply "does not wish to hear
argument" on whether the Eleventh Amendment means more than it
says.
There is an irony in the Court's repetition of its personification
follies. The roots of its twentieth-century Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence lie in two cases that were decided during the heyday of the
nineteenth-century age of the corporation and that straddle the divide
between hesitant and full-throttled battle against regulation of the
new corporate persons. The changes of the 1880s and 1890s repre-
sent a Court in transition, and as it changed, so did the Court's nas-
cent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
Two Justices whose terms were almost consecutive illustrate the
changes. Justice Bradley, appointed in 1870 and sitting until 1892,
clung to the old vision of Munn, complaining bitterly when the Court
in 1890 struck down rate legislation similar to that it had upheld in
1877.4 5 Justice Peckham, appointed in 1895, embraced the change
and indeed lambasted Munn even when he was a New York Court of
Appeals judge.46 And these differences are reflected in the Eleventh
Amendment opinions authored by each Justice. Justice Bradley wrote
the majority opinion in Hans v. Louisiana,47 which seemingly immu-
nized the states from lawsuits brought to challenge the constitutional-
ity of their actions. But as the Lochner Court found itself stymied by
states evading judicial review of regulatory legislation, it was Justice
Peckham who wrote into the doctrine the saving loophole: in 1908, a
year before he died, Justice Peckham wrote the majority opinion in Ex
parte Young,48 allowing plaintiffs-including, as in Young itself, corpo-
NELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel VIzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment
Immunity?, 106 YALE LJ. 1683 (1997).
44 For an elaboration of this argument, see Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controver-
sies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1976).
45 See Chicago, Mihvaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 461-66
(1890) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
46 See People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 34-71 (1889).
47 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the 11th Amendment bars suits against states
even by their own citizens).
48 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that suit against state officer for injunctive relief
is not suit against state for purposes of 11th Amendment).
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rations-to sue state officials to enjoin the enforcement of unconstitu-
tional laws.
But today the personifiers have switched sides. It is Justice Brad-
ley's opinion in Hans that gives the most comfort to those who would
protect the states from assaults on their dignity, and Ex parte Young
that frustrates them. Indeed, the majority in Alden and College Savings
Bank have lately been cutting back on Young, holding it inapplicable
in various situations. 49
And Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden is an eerie echo
of Justice Harlan's dissent in Young. In that dissent, Justice Harlan
argued that a suit against a state officer was equivalent to a suit against
the state. He condemned the majority's rule because it would "enable
the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official
action of the states as if they were 'dependencies' or provinces."50 Jus-
tice Kennedy voiced similar sentiments, cautioning Congress that "it
may not treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or
corporations."
5 1
Finally, there is the question of trust. Justice Harlan trusted the
states and pleaded with his colleagues to do so also. "Too little conse-
quence," he wrote, "has been attached to the fact that the courts of
the states are under an obligation equally strong with that resting
upon the courts of the Union to respect and enforce the provisions of
the Federal Constitution."52 Because of the states' obligations, Justice
Harlan believed that "[w]e must assume-a decent respect for the
States requires us to assume-that the state courts will enforce every
right secured by the Constitution. '5 3 But when the sovereign state of
Maine refused to honor federal statutory rights and its courts refused
to enforce them, Justice Kennedy took Justice Harlan's trust one step
further. Using astoundingly similar language, he wrote,
We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Con-
stitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The good
faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that "[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
54
Justice Harlan did not prevail in Ex parte Young, and the major-
ity's doctrine eventually formed a vital part of federal courts' success-
49 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44, 74-75 (1996).
50 209 U.S. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51 Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2268 (1999).
52 Young, 209 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53 Id.
54 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266.
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ful efforts to force states to obey the Constitution during the second
half of the twentieth century. Almost everyone now believes thatJus-
tice Harlan was wrong in 1908. 5 I hope it will not take another cen-
tury for the Court to see that the majority was wrong in 1999.
55 Even Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, who joined the majority in the
1999 cases, sprang to the defense of Ex parte Young when Justice Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist wanted to recast it as a balancing test. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 291-92 (1997).
2000]
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